A repair of the Faure-Loidreau (FL) public-key code-based cryptosystem is proposed. The FL cryptosystem is based on the hardness of list decoding Gabidulin codes which are special rank-metric codes. We prove that the recent structural attack on the system by Gaborit et al. is equivalent to decoding an interleaved Gabidulin code. Since all known polynomial-time decoders for these codes fail for a large constructive class of error patterns, we are able to construct public keys that resist the attack. It is also shown that all other known attacks fail for our repair and parameter choices. Compared to other codebased cryptosystems, we obtain significantly smaller key sizes for the same security level.
I I . P R E L I M I N A R I E S

A. Notations
Let q be a power of a prime and let F q denote the finite field of order q and F q m its extension field of order q m . We use F m×n q to denote the set of all m × n matrices over F q and F n q m = F 1×n q m for the set of all row vectors of length n over F q m . Further, we use another field extension F q mu with u > 1. Thus, F q ⊂ F q m ⊂ F q mu .
Rows and columns of m × n-matrices are indexed by 1, . . . , m and 1, . . . , n. Denote the set of integers [a, b] = {i : a ≤ i ≤ b}. By rank q (A) and rank q m (A), we denote the rank of a matrix A over F q , respectively F q m . By Tr q mu /q m (a) denote the Trace operator from an element a ∈ F q mu to its projection in F q m .
Let (γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γ u ) be an ordered basis of F q mu over F q m and (γ * 1 , γ * 2 , . . . , γ * u ) its dual basis. By utilizing the vector space isomorphism F q mu ∼ = F u q m , we can relate vectors a ∈ F n q mu to matrices A ∈ F u×n q m . Similarly, when we consider a basis of F q m over F q , we can represent each vector of length n in F q m as an m × n matrix in F q .
Denote by M s,q (a) ∈ F s×n q m the s × n Moore matrix for a vector a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) ∈ F n q m of length n, i.e.: If a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ∈ F q m are linearly independent over F q , then rank q m (M s,q (a)) = min{s, n}, cf. [10, Lemma 3.15 ].
B. Rank-Metric Codes and Gabidulin Codes
The rank distance between a and b is the rank of the difference of the two matrix representations:
An [n, k, d] R q code C over F q m is a linear rank-metric code, i.e., it is a linear subspace of F n q m of dimension k and minimum rank distance d. For linear codes with n ≤ m, the Singletonlike upper bound [4] , [11] implies that d ≤ n − k + 1. If d = n − k + 1, the code is called a maximum rank distance (MRD) code.
Gabidulin codes [4] are a special class of rank-metric codes and can be defined by its generator matrix as follows: A linear G(n, k) code over F q m of length n ≤ m and dimension k is defined by its k × n generator matrix G G :
where g = (g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g n ) ∈ F n q m has rank q (g) = n. Gabidulin codes are MRD codes, i.e., d = n − k + 1, cf. [4] .
C. Interleaved Gabidulin Codes
A linear (vertically, homogeneous) interleaved Gabidulin code IG(u; n, k) over F q m of length n ≤ m, dimension k ≤ n, and interleaving order u is defined by
When considering random errors of rank weight t, the code IG(u; n, k) can be decoded uniquely with high probability up to t ≤ u u+1 (n − k) errors, cf. [12] - [14] . However, it is well-known that there are many error patterns for which the known polynomial-time decoders fail. In fact, we can explicitly construct a large class of such errors, see Lemma 2 in Section V-D.
I I I . T H E O R I G I N A L FA U R E -L O I D R E A U S Y S T E M
A. Parameters
Let k, n, w, u be positive integers such that u < k < n and n − k > w > n − k 2 .
B. Key Generation
1) Choose g ∈ F n q m at random with rank q (g) = n and let
3) Choose s ∈ F w q mu with rank q (s) = w and an invertible P ∈ F n×n q at random. Compute:
The private key is (x, z) (or basically z since x can be deduced from it) and the public key is (g, k, k pub , t pub ) where
C. Encryption
Let m = (m 1 , . . . , m k−u , 0, . . . , 0) ∈ F k q m be the plaintext. Note that the upper u coefficients are chosen to be zero in order to decrypt α. The encryption of m works as follows:
1) Choose α ∈ F q mu at random. 2) Choose e ∈ F n q m such that rank q (e) ≤ t pub at random. 3) Calculate the ciphertext c ∈ F n q m : c = m · G G + Tr q mu /q m (αk pub ) + e.
D. Decryption
1)
Compute cP which results in cP = (m + Tr q mu /q m (αx))G G P + (Tr q mu /q m (αs)|0) + eP.
2) Let G denote the k×(n−w) matrix obtained by removing the first w columns of G G P and let e and c denote the last n − w positions of eP and cP, respectively. Then,
Apply a decoding algorithm on c . This gives m m+Tr q mu /q m (αx) and is possible since G is a generator matrix of a G(n − w, k < n − w) code. 
Then, we obtain the following representation of the public key k pub as a u × n matrix in F q m :
, this matrix can be seen as a codeword from an IG(u; n, k) code, corrupted by an error of rank weight w.
V. P O S S I B L E AT TA C K S O N T H E F L S Y S T E M A. (List) Decoding
An attacker can try to (list) decode either the public key k pub or the ciphertext c. However, in both cases, the number of errors that affect the Gabidulin codeword is larger than the unique decoding radius n−k 2 . Therefore, a list decoding algorithm with larger decoding radius has to be applied. However, for many families of Gabidulin codes such an efficient list decoding algorithm cannot exist [5] , [6] and therefore an efficient list decoding attack (on the public key or the ciphertext) does not exist.
B. Syndrome Decoding Attack
The ciphertext can be interpreted as a codeword from a code of dimension k (see [1] ), generated by the generator matrix 
Since the structure of this code only permits decoding like a random rank-metric code, it can be decoded with the syndrome decoding attack from [15] whose complexity is in the order
If the matrix Z ∈ F u×n q m with z 1 , . . . , z u as rows, satisfies rank q m (M n−k−w,q (Z)) = w, then the private key (x, z) can be recovered from
D. Interleaved Decoding
Based on the interpretation of Section IV, another possible attack is to apply a decoder for an interleaved Gabidulin code to the public key k pub . If w ≤ u u+1 (n − k), such a decoder will return x with high probability, but fail in certain cases.
Lemma 2 (Interleaved Decoding [12] , [13] , [16, p. 64 
])
Let w be an integer with w ≤ u u+1 (n − k) and c i = x i · G G . All efficient decoders for IG(u; n, k) codes fail to correct an
. . .
Thus, the basic idea of our repair (see Section VI) is to choose z ∈ F n q mu such that (2) holds. This makes it impossible to attack the system by decoding the public key k pub with an interleaved Gabidulin decoder. To our knowledge, this connection has not been known before.
E. Equivalence of Attack from [9] and Interleaved Decoding Theorem 3 The attack from [9] fails if and only if the attack based on interleaved decoding in Section V-D fails. In particular, it fails if (2) holds.
Proof: By definition
. . , γ * u ) denotes a dual basis to (γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γ u ). The matrix M n−w−k,q (Z) from Theorem 1 is row-space equivalent to:
The rank of this matrix cannot be come larger than w (since any vector in the right kernel of this matrix has rank weight at least n − w [17, Algorithm 3.2.1]). Thus, the failures of Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, (2) are equivalent.
F. Linearization Attack
Theorem 4 (Linearization Attack [1] ) Let k (i) pub = Tr q mu /q m (γ i k pub ) for i = 1, . . . , u and
Then, the encrypted message m can be efficiently recovered if the left kernel of M has dimension dim(ker(M)) = 1.
If (u + 2)t pub + k > n, then M has at least two more rows than columns and we have dim(ker(M)) > 1. If k pub is random and (u + 2)t pub + k ≤ n, the attack is efficient with high probability [1] . This implies the following.
Corollary 5
The linearization attack in [1] is inefficient if t pub > n−k u+2 and its work factor is q m(t pub (u+2)−n+k+1) . In this case, we must choose
G. Algebraic Attacks
Faure and Loidreau [1] also described two message attacks of exponential worst-case complexity. The first one is based on computing gcds of polynomials of degrees
Since computing the gcd of two polynomials can be implemented in quasi-linear time in the polynomials' degree, (4) gives an estimate on the work factor of this attack. The second algebraic attack is based on finding Gröbner bases of a system of n p = n k+2t pub −u+1 many polynomials of degree approximately d p = q t pub +1 −1 q−1 . The attack is only efficient for small code parameters, cf. [1, Sec. 5.3]. Since the average-case complexity of Gröbner bases algorithms is hard to estimate, we cannot directly relate n p and d p to the attack's work factor. Faure and Loidreau choose the code parameters such that n p ≈ 2 32 and d p = 127 and claim that the attack is inefficient for these values. Our example parameters in Section VIII result in at least these values.
H. Overbeck-like Attack
The key attack described in [ We choose n−k− k−u u−1 ≤ w < n−k (i.e., the Overbeck-like attack is inefficient). Notice that this imposes a rate restriction, e.g., for u = 3, we get that R 7 11 which does not cause any problem in a code-based cryptosystem.
Our repair is based on choosing z = u−1 i=0 z i γ * i in a way that
In this case, an interleaved decoder, see (2) , and therefore also the attack by Gaborit et al. [9] fails, see Theorem 3. One possible choice is to set z 1 = z 2 = · · · = z u with rank q (z 1 ) = rank q (z) = w. In this case ϕ = rank q m (M n−k−w,q (z 1 )) = n−k −w < w. This is true since w > n−k 2 , i.e., M n−k−w,q (z 1 ) has more linearly independent elements in the first row than rows. Since w > n−k 2 , the rank is less than w and an interleaved decoder fails.
In the next section, we will show that the restriction on z from (5) does not pose a problem in terms of the security level. In particular, choosing z 1 = z 2 = · · · = z u with rank q (z 1 ) = w provides the largest security level among all choices for (5) and provides an explicit construction of z.
We therefore propose the following modification of the key generation algorithm which results in z 1 = z 2 = · · · = z u with rank q (z 1 ) = rank q (z) = w.
Repair: Replace
Step 3 in Key Generation by: 3.) Choose s 1 ∈ F w q m at random with rank q (s 1 ) = w, let
All other steps of the algorithms remain the same.
Clearly, we restrict the choice of z in Step 3 of the Key Generation algorithm. We will see that there are still enough possibilities for z to preserve a high security level.
V I I . S E C U R I T Y A N A LY S I S
Our repair is designed such that an interleaved decoding attack and the attack from [9] do not work. In this section, we analyze the security level resulting from (A.) brute-forcing z, (B.) searching the kernel of (5), and (C.) the linearization attack.
Note that guessing α ∈ F q mu correctly makes it possible to reconstruct the secret message. Thus, the security of the system is limited by the number of possible values of α which is q mu .
A. Number of Possible Vectors z
For the explicit repair of (6) (where ϕ = n − k − w), the number of matrices s 1 ∈ F w q m with rank q (s 1 ) = w is larger than 0.288 · q mw , see [17, Lemma 3.13 ] and the number of full-rank matrices P ∈ F n×n q is larger than 0.288 · q n 2 . Thus, the number of possible vectors z in (6) is larger than: 0.288 2 · q mw+n 2 .
Since u < n ≤ m, this is usually larger than q mu and trying all possible z does not reduce the security of the system. In the general case of (5) (i.e., any n − k − w ≤ ϕ < w), the number of Moore matrices as in (5) and such that rank q (z) = w is given from the failure probability of an interleaved Gabidulin decoder (cf. [13] ). The number of such matrices therefore equals |z ∈ F n q mu : rank q (z) = w| · P f > 0.288 2 · q muw+n 2 · P f .
However, a lower bound on the failure probability is not known.
As an approximation, we can use P f ≈ 1/(q m ) and therefore the number of such matrices is larger than 0.288 2 · q uw+n/m . This, and the next subsection, make clear that (6) and ϕ = n − k − w is the most secure way to realize (5) .
B. Size of the Solution Space of (5)
Finding the kernel of the matrix in (5) with an interleaved decoder is equivalent solving a linear system of equations based on the syndromes with w unknowns and ϕ linearly independent equations, cf. [16, Section 4.1] . The size of the solution space of this decoder is (q m ) w−ϕ , which is maximized for the smallest-possible value of ϕ, i.e., ϕ = n − k − w. In this case the size of the solution space is (q m ) 2w−(n−k) . For w = u u+1 (n − k) , we get:
Since the size of the solution space is maximal for ϕ = n − k − w, the explicit repair from (6) is the most secure choice in this sense.
C. Linearization Attack
Theorem 6 Let M be as in (3) . Then, rank q m (M) ≤ ϕ + k + 2t pub − u.
Proof: We can write k (i)
so by elementary row operations, we can transform M into
The linearization attack is inefficient if the rank of M is smaller than its number of rows, which implies the following.
Corollary 7
If ϕ < u(t pub + 1) the linearization attack in [1] is inefficient. This is fulfilled for t pub > n−k−w u + 1 ≥ ϕ u + 1, and there are such values of t pub < n − k − 2w for any u > 1.
D. Attack By Moving to Another Close Error
The following attack [18] tries to move the vector z (which we have chosen such that the interleaved decoder fails) on a close vector for which the interleaved decoder for k pub does not fail. Therefore, a vector y ∈ F u×n q m is needed such that for z z + y it holds that rank q (z ) ≤ w and that the rank of the matrix from (5) over F q m is at least w.
Nielsen suggested to find such a vector by guessing 2w − n + k independent vectors from F n q which are in the F q -row space of z, put them as the first rows of a matrix in F um×n q (the remaining rows are zeros) and use its mapping to a matrix in F u×n q m as matrix y. That way, z is in the row space of z and rank q (z ) ≤ w is guaranteed. Further, the rank of the matrix from (5) over F q m is increased to w with high probability.
The complexity of this attack is dominated by the complexity of finding 2w − n + k independent vectors from F n q which are in the F q -row space of z, i.e.: WF Err = q (2w−n+k)(n−w) .
V I I I . PA R A M E T E R S A N D K E Y S I Z E S
To evaluate the performance of the repaired FL cryptosystem, it is compared with McEliece's cryptosystem based on Goppa codes using list decoding [19] , Loidreau's new rank-metric code-based encryption scheme [20] , [21] and the QC-MDPC cryptosystem [22] . The most efficient attack on McEliece has work factor (cf. [19] )
operations, where τ is the binary Johnson bound. The work factor of Loidreau's system [20] , [21] is WF Loi = m 3 q (tLoi−1) (k·min(m,n))/n , 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT) [15] , the linearization attack has a work factor of WF Lin = q m(utpub+u+1−ϕ) , there are WF z = 0.288 2 q mw+n 2 possible vectors z, the interleaved decoding attack needs WF ILD = q m(w−ϕ) operations, the first algebraic attack has a work factor WF Alg = q m(u−1) q m(t pub +1) −1 q m −1 and the Overbeck-like attack has complexity at least WF ILD . Table I proposes parameters for expected work factors of around 2 80 , 2 130 and 2 260 . The work factor of the repaired FL system stems from the number of operations required by the most efficient attack which is the attack by moving to another close error for 2 80 and the algebraic attack for 2 130 and 2 260 . We observe that in all cases McEliece has the highest rate followed by Loidreau, FL and QC-MDPC. The results show further that FL and QC-MDPC require much smaller key sizes compared to Loidreau and McEliece. Since public-key cryptosystems are mostly used for encrypting small data packages (usually they are used to exchange the private key of a symmetric cryptosystem), small key sizes are more important than high code rates. The QC-MDPC scheme gives no guarantee that the ciphertext can be decrypted as decoding these codes might fail while the repaired FL system guarantees decryption. Hence, the repaired FL cryptosystem has advantages compared to the other mentioned systems and should be considered as an alternative of small key size.
